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Abstract: Many contemporary human rights theorists argue that we
can establish the normative universality of human rights despite extensive
cultural and moral diversity by appealing to the notion of overlapping
consensus. In this paper I argue that proposals to ground the universality of
human rights in overlapping consensus on the list of rights are unsuccessful. I
consider an example from Islamic comprehensive doctrine in order to
demonstrate that apparent consensus on the list of rights may not in fact
constitute meaningful agreement and may not be sufficient to ground the
universality of human rights. I conclude with some general suggestions for
establishing the universality of human rights. Instead of presuming the
universality of human rights based on apparent overlapping consensus we
need to construct universality through actual dialogue both within and
between communities.

I. Introduction
The criticism that human rights are not legitimately universal
but instead reflect political and moral ideologies of western liberal
democratic states has been waged for decades and continues today.
One popular strategy adopted by several contemporary human rights
theorists to address this criticism seeks to preserve the universality of
human rights while remaining sensitive to local cultural beliefs by
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incorporating both pluralism and universalism. Theorists who adopt
this strategy appeal to John Rawls’s notion of overlapping consensus to
explain how we can have meaningful agreement about human rights
despite extensive cultural and moral diversity. We can allow for moral
pluralism regarding justification of a human rights regime and to some
extent interpretation and implementation of human rights, while
maintaining that human rights are universal because there is
widespread cross-cultural consensus on the list of rights, e.g., as
expressed in the Universal Declaration and other International Human
Rights Covenants.
In this paper I argue that while we need to find ways of
establishing the normative universality of human rights while taking
seriously moral and cultural diversity, proposals that seek to do this by
appealing to overlapping consensus on the list of rights are not the
most promising strategies. Specifically, I argue that comprehensive
belief systems, which provide justification for human rights, shape
conceptual understandings of human rights and not just interpretation
or implementation of rights. Thus, if the various belief systems upon
which justification of human rights are based are divergent enough or
incompatible, then widespread agreement on the list does not
necessarily constitute meaningful agreement and may not be sufficient
to ground the universality of human rights. I consider an example from
Islamic comprehensive doctrine in order to demonstrate that apparent
agreement on the list of rights may not in fact constitute meaningful
agreement. I conclude with some general alternative suggestions for
establishing the universality of human rights. Instead of presuming the
universality of human rights based on apparent overlapping consensus
we need to construct universality through actual dialogue both within
and between communities.

II. Universality as Overlapping Consensus at the
Level of Concepts
Proposals to construe the universality of human rights as
overlapping consensus on the list of rights are quite popular. For
example, Amy Gutmann argues that a universal human rights regime
ought to be compatible with a plurality of comprehensive belief
systems that converge on the content of the list while providing varied
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religious, social, and cultural justifications for human rights.1 Similarly,
Jack Donnelly argues that while there may be disagreement at the
levels of interpretation and implementation, there is arguably universal
agreement on human rights at the conceptual level.2 Finally, James
Nickel argues that one way to secure the universality of human rights
is to establish that there is worldwide acceptance of human rights, and
that worldwide acceptance requires acceptance of the rights
themselves, not necessarily acceptance of the same reasons or
justification for rights.3 In this paper I will focus primarily on the
proposal Jack Donnelly presents in his recent book, Universal Human
Rights in Theory and Practice, while noting that my remarks apply to
any proposal that seeks to establish the universality of human rights
through overlapping consensus on the list.
Donnelly states that human rights can be said to be universal in
at least two ways. First, they are universal in the sense that all human
beings hold these rights simply in virtue of being human and they hold
them universally against all other human beings and institutions.4
Donnelly calls this the moral universality of human rights. Understood
in this way, human rights are universal in the sense that they have
humanity as their source. Human nature contains the basis for norms
regarding what it means to live a dignified human life in the sense that
the “source of human rights is man’s moral nature.”5
Donnelly admits that the fact that human rights ultimately
depend on some prescriptive conception of human nature seems
initially to pose a problem, for few issues in moral and political
philosophy are as contested as theories of human nature. The fact that
there are so many diverse and in some cases incompatible conceptions
of human nature could pose a problem, for it raises the question of
whether it is possible to supply persuasive arguments to support a
single set of human rights norms that are universally valid. Yet,
Donnelly concludes that such profound diversity does not in fact pose
a problem. He states:
If we were faced with an array of competing and contradictory
lists of human rights clamoring for either philosophical or political
attention this inability to defend a particular theory of human nature
might be a serious short-coming. Fortunately, there is remarkable
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international normative consensus on the list of rights contained in the
Universal Declaration and in International Human Rights Covenants.6
This brings us to the second sense in which Donnelly believes
human rights can be said to be universal, namely, that there is
universal or near universal agreement on the substantive content of
the list. Donnelly relies on John Rawls’s notion of overlapping
consensus to demonstrate how meaningful convergence of diverse
comprehensive doctrines is possible and can ground the universality of
human rights. Rawls distinguishes between comprehensive religious,
moral, or philosophical doctrines and political conceptions of justice.
Since political conceptions of justice are defined as independently as
possible from any particular comprehensive doctrine, it is possible for
people who have varied and perhaps even incompatible
comprehensive doctrines to nonetheless agree on or reach an
overlapping consensus on a political conception of justice. Using this
notion of overlapping consensus, Donnelly argues that justifications for
human rights can be many and varied, but we can nonetheless
maintain that human rights are universal because there is overlapping
consensus on the human rights model and the substantive content of
the list expressed in the Universal Declaration. This is what Donnelly
calls the international normative universality of human rights.7
Donnelly spells out the nature and scope of his particular
proposal for preserving the universality of human rights and respecting
local cultural norms by arguing for a position he calls weak cultural
relativism (WCR). According to WCR, “culture is a secondary source of
the validity of a right or rule. Universality is initially presumed, but the
relativity of human nature, communities, and rules, checks potential
excesses of universalism.”8 Thus, the WCR can recognize a set of
prima facie universal human rights norms while allowing limited local
variation. Donnelly characterizes the scope of WCR by distinguishing
between the levels of concept, interpretation, and implementation and
then argues for universalism at the level of concepts; at this level, a
particular human right is an “abstract, general statement of orienting
value” in which there is substantive though general agreement on
basic meaning that will limit the range of defensible interpretations.9
Thus, cultural difference poses no real threat to the normative
universality of human rights. For though there may be a good deal of
cultural variability at the level of implementation, and perhaps even
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some at the level of interpretation, there is universal or near universal
agreement at the level of concepts; that is, there is near universal
agreement on the substantive content of the list and this, Donnelly
and others believe, is sufficient to ground the normative universality of
human rights.
Of course human rights will not be compatible with all
comprehensive doctrines, though this is itself not a problem. After all,
it is the point of human rights norms that they discriminate between
legitimate and illegitimate practices and actions, in particular those
that are just and unjust. The range of acceptable comprehensive
doctrines is set by phrases like “these rights derive from the inherent
dignity of the human person” or “all human rights derive from the
dignity and worth inherent in the human person” that appear in
various human rights declarations and documents.10 Thus, Donnelly
states that participation “in the overlapping consensus on the
Universal Declaration model is (only) possible for those who see
“human being” as a fundamental moral category and who see human
beings as in some important sense autonomous actors.”11 Human
rights will be incompatible with comprehensive doctrines that are
fundamentally inegalitarian, in particular those that do not see “human
being” as a fundamental moral category. Nonetheless, Donnelly
believes that the “basic moral equality of all human beings is not
merely accepted but strongly endorsed by all leading comprehensive
doctrines in all regions of the world” and that this “convergence on
egalitarian comprehensive doctrines, both within and between
civilizations, provides the foundation for a convergence on the rights of
the Universal Declaration.”12

III. The Non-Modularity of Moral Knowledge:
Implications for Overlapping Consensus
While I agree that we need to find some way of establishing the
universal validity of human rights, proposals like WCR may not be the
most viable way to do this. Specifically, any proposal to ground the
universality of human rights in overlapping consensus at the level of
concepts rests on suspect epistemological underpinnings regarding the
nature of moral knowledge. Drawing from the work of Margaret
Walker, I will explain briefly what this faulty view of moral knowledge
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is, why it is problematic, and the ways in which proposals like WCR
depend on it.
In her book Moral Understandings, Margaret Urban Walker
argues against a model of morality, accepted in much western analytic
ethics, that she calls the theoretical-juridical model.13 The theoreticaljuridical model is not a type of normative moral theory, but expresses
a general approach to moral theorizing that many, otherwise quite
disparate, normative moral theories share. One feature of this model
that Walker rejects is its tendency to assume that moral knowledge
consists of a pure core or compact set of beliefs that can be detached
from the particularities of any specific way of life and that differences
across cultures merely represent different applications of this same
core.14 Against this view, Walker argues that moral knowledge is not
conceptually modular, that what we know and what we can know
about morality cannot be detached from whatever other beliefs, both
moral and non-moral, we have about the world, in particular those
that constitute the social life of the respective ways of life we inhabit.
Moral understandings are not only intimately bound up with other
social understandings but are effected through them. This means that
other social and cultural understandings frame or give shape to the
meanings of moral concepts and principles. Accordingly, in
“differentiated moral-social worlds … ‘we’ may participate in different
practices that support different moral concepts or may participate in
practices whose differences give the same moral terms different
meanings.”15 I call Walker’s view the non-modularity thesis of moral
knowledge.
Walker provides the following example in order to illustrate the
non-modularity thesis. While it may seem that the Golden Rule, “Do
unto others as you would have them do unto you,” has an intuitive
egalitarian content that everyone can grasp equally well, in a context
“that does not already provide some patterns of universal egalitarian
thinking it may well only make sense in such ways as ‘Do unto others
what is appropriate to their station as you would have done to you
what is appropriate to yours.’”16 Those of us in communities that
already have “patterns of universal egalitarian thinking” take for
granted the “typical” egalitarian interpretation of the Golden Rule as
obvious if not self-evident. Yet, for such an interpretation to seem so
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obvious and so reasonable requires that we hold a certain number of
other beliefs within which this interpretation makes sense.
At this point someone might worry that the non-modularity
thesis entails radical incommensurability of moral concepts or
principles. Our ability to effectively communicate with and understand
those whose shared life is shaped by comprehensive doctrines that are
very different from our own presupposes that at some level there is
shared meaning that fixes the concept or principle in question. If
radically different comprehensive doctrines give what appear to be the
same moral terms radically different meanings, then perhaps members
of these different communities are not in fact using the same moral
terms after all. If so, then we have no basis for comparison, no shared
terms on which meaningful dialogue can proceed.
While the non-modularity thesis does not entail radical
incommensurability, the thesis does suggest that conceptual meaning
is complex and multi-layered. It may be true that we can identify
some bare, substantively thin meaning that fixes a particular concept
or term and on which many comprehensive doctrines seem to
converge. Yet, this meaning is likely to be so thin that agreement at
this level is vacuous or practically trivial. The non-modularity thesis
entails that when we make moral terms or principles substantive or
thick enough to be action-guiding, we inevitably build in substantive
premises or assumptions that attach to the moral-social worlds we
inhabit and the comprehensive doctrines that shape these worlds.
Michael Walzer makes a similar point when he discusses the
relationship between minimal and maximal moralities in his book Thick
and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad.17 When from a
distance we watch protestors in Prague demanding ‘truth’ and ‘justice’
from their political leaders there is a sense in which we see something
that we recognize. There is a minimal, thin meaning of these terms
that allows us to identify these concepts as familiar; they are not
wholly foreign. Yet, the minute we provide a more substantive account
of justice or attempt to establish action-guiding norms or principles for
how to best meet the demands of justice, we inevitably build in
premises and assumptions that attach to our own maximal or “thick”
moralities. When this happens it is not clear that members of different
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communities actually agree about what ‘justice’ is even though there is
a minimal sense in which we are using the same moral term.18
Thus, the non-modularity of moral knowledge does not entail
radical incommensurability of the sort that makes moral dialogue
across diverse cultural contexts impossible. Indeed, thin meaning may
provide that point of contact and shared epistemic turf upon which
dialogue and discussion can begin. Instead, the non-modularity of
moral knowledge suggests that we cannot presume to have the kind of
meaningful agreement required to ground the normative universality
of human rights simply because many of “us” accept the same general
moral norms or concepts. We cannot assume that overlapping
consensus on the list of rights indicates the kind of meaningful,
substantive agreement required for us to say with some confidence
that there is universal acceptance of human rights as action-guiding
norms for cross-cultural moral evaluation and critique.
Proposals such as WCR that try to ground the universality of
human rights in overlapping consensus at the level of concepts rely on
the view that moral knowledge is conceptually modular. They assume
that we can identify a core set of concepts that, while not empty, is
substantively thin enough such that many people who hold otherwise
quite disparate comprehensive doctrines can nonetheless meaningfully
accept this same core. Overlapping consensus at the level of concepts
is possible precisely because human rights are believed to consist in a
general, substantively thin core of moral knowledge that can be
detached from the particularities of any specific comprehensive
doctrine and thus be made compatible with many (though not all).
Moreover, variations across cultures are simply expressed as different
applications of this same core set of concepts. This is what Donnelly
means when he says that we can allow cultural norms to influence
implementation and, to some extent, interpretation of particular
human rights, while nonetheless maintaining that human rights are
universal. We all agree on the same core, the same concepts; cultural
norms can influence different applications (implementations) of this
core.
Yet, if the non-modularity thesis is correct then agreement at
the level of concepts will not necessarily constitute meaningful
agreement and may be insufficient to ground the universality of
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human rights. The non-modularity of moral knowledge entails that
comprehensive belief systems, which provide justification for human
rights, shape to some degree our conceptual understandings of human
rights and not just our interpretation and implementation of them. The
non-modularity thesis denies that we can make the kind of sharp
distinction between concepts and justifications that Donnelly and
others want to make in order to preserve both the universality of
human rights and respect for local cultural norms.
Donnelly admits that consensus is substantive and not merely
procedural, for only those who believe in the fundamental moral
equality of all human beings will agree to human rights norms. Yet,
this general principle still needs to be given meaning and different
comprehensive belief systems may support different meanings,
differences which may reveal that agreement on general norms does
not actually constitute meaningful agreement. This is what Walker
means when she says that “we” may inhabit different moral-social
practices that either support different concepts or give different
meanings to the same concepts.19
I do not mean to argue that overlapping consensus at the level
of concepts is not possible, or that it does not in fact happen. Rather, I
wish to caution that in order for overlapping consensus to constitute
meaningful agreement, those of us who agree must hold
comprehensive doctrines that are similar enough or in the right ways
such that they support similar conceptual understandings. In the
global arena, the variety of comprehensive doctrines that people from
different communities hold may or may not be similar enough or in the
right ways to support conceptual understandings of human rights
norms that are similar enough to establish genuine agreement on the
list. At the very least we cannot assume that they are similar enough
simply because people seem to accept the same general norms or
concepts.

IV. Islamic Comprehensive Doctrine
In order to make this point clearer and more concrete, I’d like to
consider an example from Islamic comprehensive doctrine. Many
contemporary Islamic scholars have taken great pains to demonstrate
that comprehensive religious doctrines of Islam support the
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fundamental moral and intellectual equality of all human beings. For
example, Maysam al-Faruqi explains that the comprehensive doctrines
that unify Muslim belief and practice are rooted in the Quran and that
the worldview of the Quran is committed to the fundamental moral
and intellectual equality of all human beings.20 The Quranic creation
stories explain that the sole purpose of all of creation is to worship
God; human beings have been charged with the special task of being
God’s representatives or vicergents on earth. As such, human beings
are charged with following God’s instructions for how to live and,
importantly, these instructions are to be carried out by each individual
regardless of gender or race. Faruqi emphasizes the absence of gender
distinctions when the Quran speaks of the creation and purpose of
human beings. She states:
The rights to own property, to get an education, to work, to
marry, to divorce are all granted equally in the Quran and
clearly practiced as such during the life of the Prophet. Nowhere
does the Quran affirm a difference based on race or gender in
the endowment of intelligence, ethics, talents, or anything
needed to carry out the vice-gerency and that is consistent with
the absolute transcendence and the absolute justice of God.21
Faruqi’s claims resonate with the extensive exegetical work of
scholars such as Amina Wadud who challenges traditional
interpretations of the Quran that deny the fundamental moral and
intellectual equality of all human beings.22 Similarly, Fatima Mernissi
has argued against the misuse of popular hadith reports (officially
sanctioned written reports specifying what the Prophet did or said on a
particular occasion with respect to a particular issue) to support the
view that women are intellectually and morally weak or inferior to
men, by not only challenging the legitimacy of these hadith, but also
by reexamining the role of women in the Muslim community during the
time of the Prophet.23 Given the work of these and other Islamic
scholars there is clearly a sense in which Islamic comprehensive
religious doctrines are fundamentally egalitarian in the sense required
by Donnelly and others for overlapping consensus on the list of human
rights. The Quran grants moral and intellectual equality to all human
beings regardless of gender or race and in this sense the Quran
recognizes “human being” as a fundamental moral category.
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Yet, Faruqi notes that when we move to the socio-economic
order, to the realm of family and property, things begin to look a bit
different as “the Quran clearly differentiates between the rights and
obligations of the two sexes.”24 The worldview expressed in the Quran
is one that seeks to establish a social order based on interdependence
and partnership. Yet, it takes the family rather than the individual as
the locus of this social order. Accordingly, the Quran then assigns
different rights and obligations to different family members based on
sex and age. The goal of these assignments is to establish a
fundamentally egalitarian social order and to maintain equal justice for
all. Yet, because the Quran takes the family unit rather than the
individual as primary at the socio-economic level, it does not assign
rights and obligations on the basis of the kind of blind equality that the
Universal Declaration presupposes. Indeed, Faruqi notes that there is
no notion of blind equality in the Quran.25
For example, taking the family as the primary social unit, and
recognizing the tremendous effort and toil that the mother experiences
having to carrying the child, nurse the child, and fulfill the child’s
immediate needs as an infant, the Quran assigns obligations to fathers
and brothers to bear financial burdens of family life. Faruqi states:
“The mother then already contributes a substantial share at the
physiological level. In the egalitarian system of the Quran, the father
must, therefore, face an equal obligation because the mother already
faces obligations set by biological laws.”26 The Quran assigns to the
father the responsibility of providing for mother and child financially,
because the mother should never have to shoulder financial burdens in
addition to the other physical burdens she faces. Moreover, the notion
of family central to Islamic moral understandings is not merely the
nuclear family but also the extended family for if the father cannot
meet his responsibilities, the Quran charges the extended family with
doing so. Thus, it may seem that the Quran discriminates against
women when, for example, it establishes the right of a brother to
receive twice the inheritance of his sister. Yet, when we understand
this assignment of rights within the context of a Quranic socioeconomic order we can see that the “inheritance system follows the
distribution of responsibilities within the family cell” and is designed to
ensure equal justice for all.27
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The point of exploring Faruqi’s particular discussion of this
aspect of Islamic comprehensive doctrine is to demonstrate the ways
in which comprehensive doctrines give shape and meaning to
concepts, in this case to the concept of equality. The non-modularity
thesis entails that who “we” are may generate and support different
understandings of the concept of equality. For example, even if “we”
all accept the general moral norm expressed by Article 16 of the
Universal Declaration, that all human beings are entitled to equal
rights in marriage, many of “us” may have very different
understandings of what this entails because our respective
comprehensive doctrines support different conceptual understandings
of the notion of equality. The kind of blind equality that the Universal
Declaration presumes when assigning rights to individual human
beings without reference to sex, race, creed, or nationality, is one way
to understand the notion of equality. Yet, this conceptual
understanding of ‘equality’ depends crucially on certain other social
and cultural understandings that attach to particular comprehensive
doctrines, doctrines that for example posit the individual as the
primary social unit. Other comprehensive doctrines that do not take
the individual as primary, but instead take the family as the basic
social unit, may support different understandings of the notion of
equality such that we do not actually agree even if we seem to accept
the same general norm that people deserve equal rights in marriage.28
Someone might object at this point that equality rights are
notoriously contested and controversial and that the non-modularity of
moral knowledge seems less of a problem for security rights such as
the right not to be tortured.29 Yet, even if “we” all agree that
individuals have a right not to be tortured, it is not clear that we have
achieved meaningful agreement until we know how our different
comprehensive doctrines influence our conceptual understandings of
‘torture’ including what counts as torture, the nature of the violation
that has occurred, and how cases of torture should be addressed. For
example, many believe that practices of female genital cutting are
obvious examples of torture that the international community has an
obligation to address. Yet, even if there is fairly wide-spread
agreement that this practice counts as torture (and it is not obvious
that there is), it is not yet clear that the human rights framework
provides an adequate definition of the problem as a violation of human
dignity based on the blind equality of individuals.30 The recent sexual
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abuse of Iraqi prisoners raises similar issues. Sexual abuse is a
violation of human dignity, but Islamic comprehensive doctrine may
support a particular understanding of this violation that is not
adequately captured by mere reference to a human rights framework
that leaves out any reference to religion.31
I do not mean to preclude the possibility that there exist
inconsistencies or contradictions among or within the various and
competing translations and interpretations of the Quran and other
sources that constitute Islamic comprehensive doctrine. Yet, this is not
itself a fatal flaw; rather it is a characteristic feature of any lived
morality. After all, the professed “equality of all human beings” has coexisted with the formal denial of the full equality of non-whites and
women in Western, liberal, democratic communities. Rather than
reject liberalism or certain forms of democracy because of such
inconsistencies, members of these moral communities have made
moral progress by reinterpreting what a commitment to equality in
liberal societies entails.32
The comprehensive doctrines that shape shared life are not
fixed, rigid sets of principles or codes, but are on-going interpretations
and formulations of traditions, texts, values, and ideals. No community
is homogenous and shared understandings are always contested. It is
precisely within the existing tensions and inconsistencies where
arguments and debates about who “we” are, what “we” value, and
what are the best interpretations of the understandings that shape our
shared life can occur.

V. Consensus Based On the “Universal” Threats of
Modern States and Markets
At this point, someone might object further that the nonmodularity of moral knowledge coupled with extensive diversity among
comprehensive doctrines is still not a problem for meaningful
agreement on human rights norms. Numerous scholars point out that
overlapping consensus on the list of human rights has become so
wide-spread and is meaningful enough to have normative force
because human rights are a construct designed to counter threats
posed by the rise of modern states and markets, a threat to which we
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are all now vulnerable.33 Agreement on human rights is agreement on
political norms and insofar as we are all now using modern political
institutions, we can agree on human rights as the known remedies to
safeguard against likely abuses by those institutions, despite our other
moral and political differences. Thus, meaningful agreement can be
established now because of the historical fact that we are all now using
modern political institutions.
Jim Nickel provides a very helpful analogy to make this point
clearer: the modern state is like a rotary lawnmower. A rotary
lawnmower is a device for cutting grass that has very sharp blades
parallel to the ground that can injure the operator’s feet if she gets too
close, a danger which is inherent in the device and is realized
everywhere the device is used. If people everywhere think cut up feet
are a bad thing, and if people in all countries are going to use rotary
lawnmowers, then both the dangers inherent in the device and known
remedies for protecting against these dangers need to be learned
everywhere. The modern state is similar to the rotary lawnmower in
that it has certain built-in dangers that are a threat to all who use it.
Human rights norms are known remedies for protecting against the
dangers posed by the modern state.34 Thus, despite extensive cultural
and moral diversity, insofar as we are all using modern political and
economic institutions and are vulnerable to the dangers inherent in
such institutions, we can achieve overlapping consensus on human
rights as the set of remedies to protect us from such dangers.
The point of drawing any analogy is to highlight and clarify a
particular feature of an entity or process, and Nickel’s analogy is
helpful in highlighting those violations or threats to human dignity
posed by certain systematic deficiencies of modern political and
economic institutions.35 Nickel concedes that not all of the problems
human rights address derive from abuses of political institutions, and
that consensus may be more controversial on those rights that deal
with social issues, such as equality rights. Moreover, he notes that we
need a view of rights that is broader than merely focusing on problems
caused by modern political institutions.36 Yet, since so many human
rights theorists appeal to the universality of modern political and
economic institutions as a historical condition that makes overlapping
consensus on human rights plausible and effective, I think it is worth
pointing out the limitations of such an approach.
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Focusing on human rights as a response to “the” dangers posed
by modern political and economic institutions simply shifts the problem
of the non-modularity of moral knowledge, for it still assumes that we
can isolate a pure core of moral knowledge that is applicable to all. In
this case, the pure core is “the” effects of modern states and markets,
which can be divorced from the particularities of comprehensive
doctrines. Yet, the effects of modern states and markets are not
experienced everywhere in the same way precisely because of the
ways in which these institutions interact with already existing
comprehensive doctrines. Though the rise of modern states and
markets may now be a global phenomenon, i.e., though we may all be
using rotary lawnmowers, we are cutting different kinds of grass, with
different kinds of blades, which may present different kinds of dangers
that are more or less strongly felt in different places. The effects of
processes of modernization are not experienced in the same way by all
people everywhere because these processes are one variable among
many that intersect in complex ways to create the multifaceted and
complex oppressive situations that people in different places find
themselves in.37
Donnelly spends a good deal of time arguing that even though
the current human rights model originated in “the West” this “tells us
absolutely nothing about the “applicability,” “relevance,”
“appropriateness,” or “value” of these ideas … either inside or outside
the West.”38 We do not assume that gun powder is applicable only in
China simply because it was invented there; we should not make the
same mistake regarding human rights.39 I agree with Donnelly that the
Western origins of the current human rights model do not necessarily
make human rights irrelevant to other cultures. Yet, modern political
institutions do not exist in a vacuum. Their effects cannot be easily
isolated from the other social and cultural practices and beliefs they
interact with in particular places to generate the complex threats to
human dignity that people experience, threats that have many
sources. Thus, we cannot assume that “our” particular experiences of
the dangerous effects of modern political and economic institutions
represent “the” inherent dangers in the device. We can acknowledge
what we think we know about some of the dangers of modern political
and economic institutions based on our experiences of their effects
thus far, but we also will need to actually examine what effects such
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institutions have in other places as they interact with other local
customs, practices, and frameworks.

VI. Navigating Our Way between Universalism
and Relativism: Constructing Consensus
Thus far I have shown why conventional strategies for
grounding the normative universality of human rights in overlapping
consensus may not be the most viable strategies for achieving the kind
of meaningful consensus required in order for us to say with some
confidence that human rights are universally valid. Yet, this does not
mean that we need to abandon a human rights approach altogether.
In the case of Islam, Maysam Al-Faruqi recommends that the
definitions of the problems Muslim women face must come from within
an Islamic framework and that Islam alone will provide the solutions.40
Though her points need to be taken very seriously, her proposal seems
problematic for the same reasons that WCR does: it isolates and
emphasizes only one variable among many that give shape to the
various forms of oppression that Muslim women face. Insofar as her
approach ignores the very real influences of processes of
modernization and the ways these interact with already existing
religious frameworks, it too will be insufficient to adequately define
and address these problems. What we need are more contextualized,
empirically informed strategies to better understand the kinds of
violations that are occurring in different places and to identify the
multiple sources of these violations in order to know how best to
address them and if human rights are an appropriate part of the
solution.
Drawing from the work of Abdullahi An-Na’im, I conclude with
some extremely general suggestions for how we might proceed in
establishing the universality of human rights. An-Na’im suggests that
the “universality of human rights should be seen as a product of a
process rather than as an established “given” concept and specific
predetermined normative content to be discovered or proclaimed
through international declarations and rendered legally binding
through treaties.”41 Instead of presuming consensus, we should
attempt to construct an overlapping consensus on the meaning and
implications of universal human rights through internal discourse
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within cultures and cross-cultural dialogue among them. Discourse
aimed at constructing consensus needs to be as inclusive as possible,
representing as many diverse views as possible, for the meanings and
interpretations of comprehensive doctrines are contested.
Human rights advocates should use whatever arguments are
likely to be persuasive to the members of a specific community or
whatever means necessary to address their apprehensions and
concerns, in relation to whatever frame of reference is accepted by
that community as authoritative or applicable. This means that we
cannot ignore the religious, moral, or philosophical frameworks that
people in particular communities take as authoritative, nor can we
merely allow them to influence implementation of rights; rather we
need to engage these frameworks and pay attention to the nuances
and complexities of comprehensive doctrines in order to figure out
what conceptual understandings they in fact do support.
This approach does not preclude pointing out existing
inconsistencies or contradictions within Islamic or any other
comprehensive doctrine. Nor does this approach necessarily prohibit
pointing out flaws or contradictions so great they prove to be fatal,
rendering a particular worldview or framework unstable or
insupportable. Yet, too often theorists presume to have identified
inconsistencies or contradictions without really understanding the
comprehensive doctrine in question. In practice I think it will rarely be
the case that we find flaws so fatal they warrant rejecting a
comprehensive doctrine and the way of life it supports in its entirety.
It is more often the case that particular beliefs or understandings need
reforming or reformulating; in order to know whether this is the case,
and in order to do the reinterpretive work, we need to engage in actual
dialogue with those who live by the comprehensive doctrine in
question.42
An-Na’im’s proposal for grounding the universality of human
rights in overlapping consensus differs from more conventional appeals
to overlapping consensus in at least three important respects. First,
instead of presuming that any comprehensive doctrine that is
fundamentally egalitarian will be compatible with and support the list
of human rights, An-Na’im requires that we construct consensus
through actual dialogue both between and within communities.
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Second, instead of trying to isolate “the” threats of modern states and
markets and construe human rights as remedies to these threats, AnNa’im stresses the importance of being attentive to the ways in which
processes of modernization intersect with comprehensive doctrines
and other local, regional, and global factors to create complex forms of
oppression that have many sources. Third, instead of pointing to the
fact that representatives from many different countries (primarily
political leaders) have signed onto the Universal Declaration and other
International Human Rights Covenants as evidence that human rights
are increasingly universally supported, An-Na’im’s account requires
that dialogue for constructing consensus be as inclusive as possible
representing as many diverse views as possible (not just the views of
political elites).
My remarks against appeals to overlapping consensus as a
viable strategy (to secure the universality of human rights while
remaining sensitive to moral and cultural diversity) do not entail that
we should reject this strategy altogether. Rather, they suggest that we
need to rethink the way we employ it. Theorists have typically simply
presumed overlapping consensus on the list of rights among
comprehensive doctrines that support the fundamental equality of all
human beings. This is a presumption that we cannot rightfully make,
for we cannot know if we have the kind of meaningful agreement
necessary to establish human rights as universally accepted until we
know what conceptual understandings of particular rights various
comprehensive doctrines actually support. We must take relativist
worries more seriously than simply allowing for local cultural variation
to influence the implementation of human rights norms. We begin to
take relativist worries seriously by first acknowledging the difficulty of
establishing universally valid and applicable norms, and then by
working with and within the frameworks and worldviews that people
already take as authoritative. We need deeply contextual knowledge of
local customs, traditions, beliefs, and practices, and we need to
engage with these comprehensive frameworks and doctrines in order
to construct rather than presume meaningful consensus. This strategy
is more likely to achieve genuine consensus because it is more likely to
accurately define the problems people face as the complex problems
that they are and thus to meet these problems with the multifaceted
solutions they require. How we go about doing this is a complicated
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matter, but this only reflects the complexity of the world we live in and
the increasingly global relationships we engage in.43
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